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INTRODUCTION
Judging is difficult. This is obviously so in cases where the law is unclear
or the facts are uncertain. But even in those cases where the law is as clear as it
can be, and where the relevant facts have been fully developed, judges might
still have difficulty getting it right. Why do judges misjudge?
Judges, I will argue, possess three sets of "blinders": informational blind-
ers, cognitive blinders, and attitudinal blinders. These blinders make adjudica-
tion on the merits - by which I mean the accurate application of governing law
to the facts of the case - difficult. This difficulty, in turn, has important impli-
cations for disputants and their lawyers for it bears directly on the choice of
dispute-resolution forum.
In Part I of this paper, I will develop the positive argument that judges
sometimes misjudge due to these three sets of blinders. To do so, I will rely
largely on experimental research from psychology and empirical research from
political science. Having developed the positive argument in Part I, I will turn
to the prescriptive argument in Part II. There, I will explore the forum-selec-
tion implications of misjudging - namely, I will argue that the risk of misjudg-
ing suggests that various alternative dispute resolution processes, for different
reasons and in different ways, might serve disputants better than adjudication.
I. BLINDERS
In 1931, Jerome Frank published an article in the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review entitled Are Judges Human?' The answer to this ques-
tion is self-evident; despite their fancy titles, their magisterial robes, and their
elevated stature in the courtroom, judges are human. And like all humans,
judges err.2
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' Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931).
2 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (providing experimental evidence demonstrating that judges
are susceptible to cognitive illusions); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, I
AM. LAW & ECON. REv. 26, 29 (1999) (finding that "judges exhibit a variety of biases");
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
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That judges err is acknowledged by our legal system. If there were no risk
of judicial error, there would be no need for appellate courts. In fact, however,
the federal judiciary includes two levels of appellate courts,3 and most states
have adopted a similar structure.4 Appellate courts at both the federal and state
levels exist in large part to correct judicial error committed below.5
The legal system implicitly assumes that judicial error is infrequent, ran-
dom, and often "harmless." In fact, however, there is reason to believe that
misjudging is more common, more systematic, and more harmful than the legal
system has fully realized. Empirical evidence suggests that judges possess
three sets of "blinders:" informational, cognitive, and attitudinal blinders.6
These blinders, which can be understood as "obstacle(s) to clear judgment and
perception, ' 7 do not lead inexorably to judicial error, but they do increase the
likelihood of inaccurate outcomes in court.8
A. Informational Blinders
Judges need information to manage and adjudicate cases. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (and comparable provisions in the states) provide for
the identification and disclosure of information through the disclosure and dis-
covery processes.9 The Federal Rules of Evidence (and comparable provisions
in the states) distinguish information that is admissible at trial from that which
should be excluded.10 Throughout the litigation process, judges come into con-
tact with this information at settlement conferences, motion hearings, discovery
disputes, and trial itself.
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005)
(providing experimental evidence demonstrating that judges frequently have difficulty disre-
garding relevant, but inadmissible, evidence when making substantive decisions).
' See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000) (federal court structure).
4 See, e.g., Roger A. Hanson & David B. Rottman, United States: So Many States, So Many
Reforms, 20 JusT. SYS. J. 121,. 122 (1999) (noting that forty of fifty states have both an
intermediate appellate court and a court of last resort).
I See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 382 n.6 (1995) (citing sources). But see Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the
Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62 (1985) (challenging the conven-
tional wisdom that the appellate process is designed to correct errors).
6 As noted infra, there is significant overlap between those blinders I have labeled "informa-
tion" and those I have labeled "cognitive."
7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 288 (2d ed. 1989).
8 Another source of judicial error is what Geoffrey Miller calls "bad judging":
Most examples of bad judging can be grouped in the following categories: (1) corrupt influence
on judicial action; (2) questionable fiduciary appointments; (3) abuse of office for personal gain;
(4) incompetence and neglect of duties; (5) overstepping of authority; (6) interpersonal abuse; (7)
bias, prejudice, and insensitivity; (8) personal misconduct reflecting adversely on fitness for
office; (9) conflict of interest; (10) inappropriate behavior in a judicial capacity; (11) lack of
candor; and (12) electioneering and purchase of office.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REv. 431, 432-33 (2004). This is not the
source of error on which this paper focuses.
9 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 45 (providing disclosure and discovery rules to guide the
civil litigation process).
10 See generally FED. R. EVID.; MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 149 (1997)
(observing the "striking emphasis on the screening of information to be submitted to triers of
fact").
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Inevitably, some of this information, though highly relevant to the case at
hand, will be inadmissible under the applicable evidentiary rules. Unfortu-
nately, however, judges (as well as jurors)11 possess informational blinders that
can prevent them from disregarding this inadmissible information when making
merits-based decisions, like assessing liability or awarding damages. In other
words, judges have difficulty "unbit[ing] the apple of knowledge""t when mak-
ing decisions.
To illustrate the operation and impact of informational blinders on judicial
decision making, I report below the results of three experiments. The first
implicates rules prohibiting the introduction of subsequent remedial mea-
sures;13 the second focuses on the attorney-client privilege; 4 and the third con-
siders the prejudicial impact of prior criminal convictions. 5 In each of these
experiments - as well as in others not reported here 16 - researchers used a
"between-subject" experimental design in which they randomly assigned
judges to a control group or an experimental group.' 7 Regardless of group, the
researchers presented all of the judges with identical information about a case,
except that they exposed the judges in the experimental group to inadmissible
evidence. They then asked the judges in both groups to "rule" on liability or
damages. Finally, they compared the responses of the judges in each of the
groups, and if they detected statistically meaningful differences, they could
attribute them to the inadmissible information because it was the only thing
varied between the two randomly assigned groups.1 8
1. Subsequent Remedial Measures
The Federal Rules of Evidence (along with companion state provisions)
prohibit the introduction of evidence of "subsequent remedial measures" for the
purpose of establishing liability.19 Suppose, for example, that a grocery shop-
per, who slips and falls in the produce aisle due to spilled fruit on the floor,
" For a summary of the work on jurors, see Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 2,
at 1270-76.
12 DAMASKA, supra note 10, at 50.
13 See Part I(A)(1), infra.
14 See Part I(A)(2), infra.
15 See Part I(A)(3), infra.
16 See generally Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 2.
17 See, e.g., C. JAMES GOODWIN, RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGY: METHODS AND DESIGN 171-
72 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining between-subject designs).
18 See, e.g., JOHN J. SHAUGHNESSY & EUGENE B. ZECHMEISTER, RESEARCH METHODS IN
PSYCHOLOGY 182 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining that in such a design, "if the groups perform
differently, it is presumed that the independent variable" - in this case, the inadmissible
evidence - "is responsible"). For a fuller description of this methodology, see Wistrich,
Guthrie, & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1282-84.
19 Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken
previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect
in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EVID. 407.
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sues the grocery store. If the grocery store subsequently takes steps to prevent
that kind of harm from occurring again - perhaps by instituting a practice of
sweeping every thirty minutes during store hours - the shopper cannot intro-
duce this new practice into evidence to establish the grocery store's liability.
The evidentiary rule prohibiting the introduction of subsequent remedial mea-
sures is designed to give defendants like the grocery store incentive to take
precautions against causing subsequent harm.2 °
Despite the inadmissibility of such evidence, it seems reasonable to specu-
late that a judge who becomes aware of measures taken by a defendant after an
accident, even though inadmissible, might have difficulty disregarding this
information when assessing liability. Stephan Landsman and Richard Rakos
investigated this very issue in a study involving judges attending a session on
"Specific Fact Finding" at the Ohio Judicial Conference in 1992.21
At the conference, Landsman and Rakos gave judges a case entitled
"Thompson v. Containex Corporation. "22 All of the judges received the fol-
lowing common facts:
The plaintiff, Joseph Thompson, claims that on November 5, 1990, he was at home
raking leaves. After gathering a considerable pile he attempted to burn them as was
allowed by local ordinance. The leaves were somewhat wet and would not burn so
he went to his garage and got out a gasoline container in which he kept fuel for his
lawn mower. He poured some gasoline on the smoldering leaves and claims that a
sheet of flame immediately ran up the pouring stream of gasoline into the gasoline
container causing it to explode. Mr. Thompson was badly burned in the incident and
says the container's manufacturer, Containex Corporation, produced a hazardously
defective product because it had no flame arrester, a wire mesh screen over the
mouth of the can, to prevent the sort of flashback effect that allegedly caused Mr.
Thompson's injury.
Containex Corporation claims that the incident was not its fault and that the container
did not explode. Containex asserts that the plaintiff, Mr. Thompson, poured a great
deal of gasoline on the leaves and was burned when the fuel ignited all at once.
Containex claims that experiments it has conducted demonstrate that explosions of
the sort described by Mr. Thompson virtually never happen and that wire mesh flame
arrestor screens are useless in small containers where there is insufficient room for
the oxygen necessary to form explosive mixtures.
23
Landsman and Rakos randomly assigned the judges to a control group or
an experimental group. The control group judges received the facts above; the
experimental group judges received the facts above as well as the following
information about a subsequent remedial measure undertaken by the defendant:
At a pretrial hearing Containex Corporation moved to prohibit the introduction at
trial of a 1992 warning and recall letter sent out by Containex to the purchasers of its
fuel containers at the direction of the Federal Consumer Product Safety Board.
Under protest, Containex sent all purchasers a notice informing them of the possibil-
ity of flashbacks in its gasoline storage containers. Containex seeks the exclusion of
20 See, e.g., the notes to FED. R. EvID. 407.
21 Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Effect of Poten-
tially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. ScI. & L.
113, 120 (1994).
22 Id. at 121.
23 Id.
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this evidence because it is a "subsequent remedial measure" and as such should be
barred from the trial as required by Rule 407 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence. The
Court, in accordance with sound precedent has [granted/denied] the company's
motion. 4 Because of illness, the original judge has asked to have another judge try
the case and you have been assigned to hear the matter.
25
Despite the fact that the evidence was inadmissible and had been ruled as
such, the researchers speculated that the judges would be influenced by it. This
is what they found. All of the judges in the control group ruled in favor of the
defendant, finding no liability. In the experimental group, by contrast, only
75% ruled in favor of the defendant; 25% of the judges ruled that the defendant
should be held liable.26 In short, "judges who were not exposed to the motion
to exclude evidence found the company liable significantly less often than
judges who were exposed to the motion to exclude evidence., 27
2. Privilege
In conjunction with the common law, the Federal Rules of Evidence
(along with companion state provisions) privilege certain communications, 28
including those between husbands and wives, psychotherapists and patients,
and attorneys and clients. 29 The attorney-client privilege rests on the assump-
tion that clients will disclose critical information to their attorneys only if they
know that such disclosure will not harm them. If such disclosures were to see
24 The researchers divided the judges into a control group and two experimental groups, one
of which learned that the prior judge had granted the motion to suppress and the other of
which learned that s/he had not. Id. The researchers also compared judge groups to juror
groups. Id. at 121-22. The comparison of interest in this paper is the control group judges to
the experimental group judges that granted the motion to suppress, so that is all I report here.
25 Id. at 121.
26 Id. at 124 tbl.3. The difference in responses between the two groups is statistically signif-
icant. Id.
27 Id. at 122. Landsman and Rakos also tested jurors drawn from the Cuyahoga County,
Ohio Court of Common Pleas. Id. at 120. Among jurors assigned to a control group, which
did not learn of the subsequent remedial measure, 91.2% ruled in favor of the defendant,
finding no liability. Id. at 124. In the experimental group, by contrast, only 72.7% ruled in
favor of the defendant; 27.3% of the jurors ruled that the defendant should be liable. Id.
Regarding their overall results, Landsman and Rakos concluded as follows:
The data presented above suggest that judges and jurors in civil cases react similarly when
exposed to material that is subsequently ruled inadmissible - their perceptions of central trial
issues are altered. Most critically, both judges' and jurors' determinations of defendant liability
were less frequent when the material potentially damaging to the defendant was not introduced
into the process.
Id. at 125.
28 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privi-
lege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of
a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
29 See, e.g., notes to FED. R. EvD. 501.
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the light of day in court, clients would refrain from providing their attorneys
with information important to their case. This, in turn, would prevent attorneys
from providing appropriate representation to their clients.3 °
Judges occasionally come into contact with information protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Even if they rule such evidence inadmissible, judges
might have great difficulty disregarding this privileged information if it sheds
light on the case. This, in turn, could mean that judicial decisions on the merits
might be influenced inappropriately by inadmissible information.
This is precisely what Andrew Wistrich, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and I found in
a recent study involving federal magistrate judges attending a conference in
San Diego and state trial judges attending a conference in Phoenix. 31 We gave
the judges a vignette entitled "Evaluation of a Contract Dispute."3 In this
vignette, the judges learned that they were presiding in a case involving a con-
tract dispute between Jones, a consultant, and SmithFilms, a movie studio. The
contract issue in dispute was whether the studio offered Jones producer credit
when it hired him to work on the movie. The only writing in the case was a
brief letter co-signed by Jones and Smith, the owner of the studio. It stated that
"Jones will provide various services to SmithFilms, that Jones will continue to
be paid a monthly salary as an independent contractor until the film is released,
and that Jones will receive such other consideration as was agreed upon by the
parties during the pre-signing breakfast."3 3
Jones contended that Smith offered him producer credit at the breakfast as
part of the deal. To corroborate his claim, he offered testimony at trial from a
waitress who stated that she thought she overhead Jones and Smith discussing
producer credit. Unfortunately, Smith fell seriously ill and was unavailable to
testify, so the studio's only viable rebuttal was to argue that SmithFilms gener-
ally does not offer such credit.
We randomly assigned the judges to either a control group or an experi-
mental group. We asked the judges in both groups to rule for the plaintiff or
the defendant. The only difference between the two groups was that we
exposed the judges in the experimental group to information protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Specifically, the experimental group judges learned
that they had to resolve a discovery dispute before ruling on the merits of the
case. They learned that SmithFilms had filed a motion to compel production of
an audiotaped conversation between Jones and his business attorney (not the
litigator representing him in this case). Jones argued that the conversation was
protected by the attorney-client privilege, but SmithFilms argued that it was not
protected because Jones was seeking business advice, not legal advice. To
resolve this dispute, the judges listened to the tape in camera. It included the
following excerpt:
30 See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that the privilege "is
founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons
having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely
and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure").
I Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1294 n.170.
32 See id. at 1294-98, 1334-35.
33 Id. at 1295.
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Jones: I really needed this deal and I was afraid that asking for producer credit might
be a turn-off, so I got nervous and did not ask for it. But I meant to. I need your
legal opinion, Greg. Suppose that I send Smith a letter now saying that I meant for
producer credit to be part of the deal. Would that be legally binding?
Gonzalez: No. If you and Smith did not agree on producer credit during breakfast,
you don't have a leg to stand on. A letter now won't help.
Jones: Darn. That's a shame.
34
Moreover, "[t]he rest of the audiotape confirm[ed] that Gonzales was
functioning solely in a legal capacity." We then asked these judges to rule on
the motion to compel, which most of them denied.3 5
We compared the liability determinations of the judges in the control
group to the judges in the experimental group who ruled the conversation inad-
missible. Despite the fact that the latter group of judges ruled the tape inadmis-
sible, and thereby communicated by virtue of their ruling that it should not have
any impact on their liability determinations, it did. In the control group, 55.6%
of the judges (25 out of 45) ruled for the plaintiff in this contract case; by
contrast, among the judges in the experimental group who heard the damning
evidence but ruled it inadmissible, only 29.2% (7 out of 24) ruled for the plain-
tiff.3 6 Thus, exposure to the privileged information appears to have influenced
the judges' decisions. Although a majority of the judges who had not seen the
privileged materials ruled in favor of the plaintiff, fewer than 30% of the judges
who determined the materials were privileged ruled the same way. In other
words, the privileged information reduced the plaintiffs win rate by nearly
50%. Even though the judges themselves ruled that the information was privi-
leged, and therefore inadmissible, the information protected by the privilege
appears to have had a substantial impact on their assessments of liability.
3. Prior Criminal Conviction
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence (and many companion state provi-
sions), a dated criminal conviction is generally inadmissible at trial on the
grounds that the judge or jury might be prejudiced against a litigant with a
criminal past. Under Rule 609(b) of the Federal Rules, this evidence is inad-
missible if more than ten years have passed since the completion of a sentence
following from a conviction unless "the probative value of the conviction [is]
supported by specific facts and circumstances [and] substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect."37
Even if judges appropriately exclude such evidence, they might nonethe-
less have difficulty ignoring it when assessing the credibility of a litigant with a
criminal history, particularly if the crime bears some relationship to the credi-
bility issue in dispute in the case at bar. Wistrich, Rachlinski, and I investi-
gated this. To do so, we gave federal magistrate judges attending a conference
34 Id.
3 Id. at 1296. Two-thirds of the judges (24 of 36) denied the motion to compel. Id.
36 Id. The difference in the responses of the two groups is statistically significant. Id.
7 FED. R. EvID. 609(b).
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in Minnesota and state judges attending a conference in Phoenix a vignette
entitled "Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages. 3 8
In this vignette, the judges learned they were presiding in a products liabil-
ity trial in which the only remaining issue in dispute was the appropriate
amount of pain and suffering damages to award to a thirty-five-year-old auto-
mobile mechanic who was badly injured while operating a piece of machinery
(either a lawnmower for judges in Arizona or a snowblower for judges in Min-
nesota). The machinery was equipped with a kill switch that should have pre-
vented the injury, but a manufacturing defect caused the switch to fail, resulting
in a serious injury to the plaintiff's non-dominant arm. The defendant manu-
facturer conceded liability and pecuniary damages but disputes the pain and
suffering damages.
With respect to those damages, the plaintiff presented testimony from doc-
tors concerning the extent of his injury. The doctors testified that his arm did
not need to be amputated, but it was likely to remain useless nonetheless. The
plaintiff testified that he had "continuing pain in his arm"' 9 and that he had lost
his job, that he experienced a lot of pain and frustration, and that he had to take
prescription narcotics continuously to combat the discomfort. The manufac-
turer contended that the plaintiff was exaggerating his injury. To corroborate
this defense, the manufacturer offered the testimony of an occupational thera-
pist, who testified that people with injuries like these "usually can control their
pain and lead relatively normal lives."4 °
We assigned some of the judges to a control group and some to an experi-
mental group. We asked the judges in both groups to report the total pain and
suffering damages they would award in this case. Before responding to this
question, though, the judges in the experimental group learned that the manu-
facturer wanted to introduce evidence showing that the plaintiff "had been con-
victed of swindling schemes in which he obtained the life savings of elderly
retirees by falsely promising them exorbitant rates of return, and then using
their money to pay his living expenses."'" The plaintiff's most recent convic-
tion occurred fourteen years ago, and he completed his prison sentence twelve
years ago. Thus, the plaintiff objected to the introduction of this testimony
under Rule 609 on the grounds that the probative value of the dated conviction
did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect. The judges in the experi-
mental condition were asked to rule on the plaintiffs objection to the introduc-
tion of this evidence, and more than 80% of them granted the plaintiffs
objection to suppress this evidence.42
We again compared the responses of the judges in the control group to
those of the judges in the experimental group who ruled the evidence inadmis-
sible. We found that the judges who ruled the evidence inadmissible were
inclined to award the plaintiff less in pain and suffering damages than were
those in the control group. Specifically, as shown in Table 1, the judges in the
control group awarded a mean amount of $778,000 and a median amount of
38 Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1305.
39 Id. at 1305.
40 Id. at 1306.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1306-07.
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$500,000; judges in the experimental group awarded a mean amount of
$685,000 and a median amount of $400,000.4 ' Thus, this relevant, but inad-
missible, information reduced the mean award by 12% and the median award
by 20%. Even though the judges themselves ruled that the information was
inadmissible, the information appears to have had a substantial impact on their
damage awards.
TABLE 1. PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION RESULTS4 4
Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Control (43) $778,000 $300,000 $500,000 $1,000,000
Experimental/
Suppression (61) $685,000 $200,000 $400,000 $ 800,000
4. Summary
This work, along with other work not reported here,4 5 suggests that judges
possess informational blinders that can make it difficult for them to deliberately
disregard relevant but inadmissible evidence when making merits-based deci-
sions in court. For litigants, this means that case outcomes can be influenced
by evidence that should not, as a matter of law, affect those outcomes. In other
words, these informational blinders can lead to misjudging and inaccurate out-
comes in court.
B. Cognitive Blinders
Cognitive blinders can also lead to misjudging. These blinders, like the
informational blinders discussed above, speak to the way judges (and others)
make judgments and decisions. Psychologists have discovered that people do
not make decisions based on a thorough accounting and rational calculation of
all available information. Rather than behaving like fully rational actors, peo-
ple use "heuristics" or simple mental shortcuts to make decisions.46 These
" Id. This difference is marginally statistically significant. Id.
44 Id. at 1307.
15 We also found that information protected by rape shield laws as well as information
protected by post-conviction cooperation agreements nonetheless influenced judges when
such information came to light. Id. at 1298-1303, 1308-12. But see id. at 1313-22 (finding
that judges were unaffected in criminal cases by inculpatory evidence illegally obtained in a
search or by an inadmissible confession).
46 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman established the "heuristics and biases" research
program in the early 1970s when they discovered that people tend to "rely on a limited
number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities and
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations." Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1127-28 (1974) [here-
inafter Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment]. Initially, they identified three basic heuristics, but
most decision researchers use the phrase "heuristics and biases" to refer to a long list of
mental shortcuts that people use to make judgments and decisions. For collections, see
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich,
Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIS-
TICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) [hereinafter
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
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heuristics often lead to good decisions,4 7 but they can also create cognitive
blinders that produce systematic errors in decision making. 48 To establish the
impact and operation of cognitive blinders, I focus below on three, each of
which can lead to misjudging: anchoring, hindsight bias, and self-serving bias.
1. Anchoring
When making numerical estimates, people commonly rely on the initial
value available to them. The initial value provides a starting point that anchors
the subsequent estimation process.49 People generally adjust away from the
anchor, but they do so insufficiently, giving the anchor greater influence on the
final estimate than it should have. In short, "the number that starts the genera-
tion of a judgment exerts a stronger impact than do subsequent pieces of
numeric information.
50
Often, anchoring is adaptive because the initial numeric value bears some
relation to the value of the item being estimated. Other times, however, the
initial numeric value can be quite misleading, and can still influence estimates.
In the classic illustration,5" Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman asked sub-
jects to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United Nations.
Before doing so, however, they spun a "wheel of fortune," which they had
rigged to stop either at ten or sixty-five. They asked their study participants,
whom they had divided into two groups, whether the percentage of African
countries in the U.N. was higher or lower than the number determined by the
seemingly arbitrary spin of the wheel. They found that this number, which is
obviously unrelated to the percentage of African nations in the U.N., nonethe-
less had a dramatic impact on the subjects' estimates. When the wheel landed
on ten, subjects estimated that 25% of African countries were members of the
U.N.; when the wheel landed on sixty-five, however, subjects estimated that
number at 45%.52
Researchers have found that anchoring influences the damages that mock
jurors award in civil cases. In several studies,53 for example, researchers have
47 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment, supra note 46, at 1124 (noting that "[i]n
general, these heuristics are quite useful"). For more on the adaptive properties of heuristics,
see SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & ABC
Research Group eds., 1999).
48 See e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment, supra note 46, at 1124 (observing that heuris-
tics can "lead to severe and systematic errors").
49 Id. at 1128 ("[D]ifferent starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward
the initial values.").
50 Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Heuristic Strategies for Estimation Under Uncer-
tainty: The Enigmatic Case of Anchoring, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION: A FEST-
SCHRIFT IN HONOR OF ROBERT S. WYER, JR. 79, 80 (Galen V. Bodenhausen & Alan J.
Lambert eds., 2003).
sI Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment, supra note 46, at 1128.
52 Id.
13 See Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You
Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519 (1996);
Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects
of Plaintiff's Requests and Plaintiff's Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 445 (1999); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Dam-
age Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991 (1995); John Malouff
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explored the impact that the plaintiffs lawyer's damages request can have on
mock jurors. To do so, they randomly assigned mock jurors to different
groups, all of whom learned the same basic facts about a hypothetical case.
The only thing that varied across the groups was the amount of damages the
plaintiffs lawyer requested. In all of the published studies, the damages
request had a significant impact on the damages the mock jurors awarded.54 In
one study, for instance, mock jurors awarded slightly more than $90,000 when
the plaintiffs lawyer requested $100,000 in damages; but when the plaintiffs
lawyer requested $500,000 in the same case, mock jurors awarded nearly
$300,000 in damages.
Similarly, researchers have found that statutory damages caps can serve to
anchor mock jurors' damages awards in civil cases.56 In one study,5 7 Jennifer
Robbennolt and Christina Studebaker presented mock jurors with a case involv-
ing a plaintiff who had developed HIV through a blood transfusion. The mock
jurors learned that the plaintiff had sued the company that had provided the
infected blood, asserting that it had engaged in irresponsible testing practices.
The researchers asked the mock jurors to indicate how much they would award
the plaintiff in compensatory and punitive damages. Some jurors were told that
the jurisdiction imposed a $100,000 cap on punitive damages; others that the
jurisdiction imposed a $5 million cap on punitive damages; and still others that
the cap was $50 million.58 The researchers found that the punitive damages
caps anchored the subjects' assessments of both compensatory and punitive
damages. For example, subjects in the $100,000 condition awarded an average
of $1,518,100 in total damages, while subjects in the $50 million condition
awarded an average of $22,642,417. 59
Likewise, Rachlinski, Wistrich, and I have found that anchoring influences
judicial decision making. In one study, 60 we demonstrated that a demand made
at a pre-hearing settlement conference anchored judges' assessments of the
appropriate amount of damages to award in the case. We presented the trial
judges participating in our study with a lengthy vignette describing a civil case
in which the plaintiff had suffered several injuries in a car accident caused by a
negligent truck driver:
& Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage
Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491 (1989); Allan Raitz, Edith
Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Determining Damages: The Influence of
Expert Testimony on Jurors' Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385 (1990). See
also VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 80 (1986) (reporting an experi-
ment in which a mock jury appeared susceptible to a damage amount suggested by an
attorney).
54 See Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 53, at 526-27; Hastie et al., supra note 53, at 463;
Hinsz & Indahl, supra note 53, at 1009; Malouff & Schutte, supra note 53, at 495; Raitz et
al., supra note 53, at 393.
51 Malouff & Schutte, supra note 53, at 495 tbl.1.
56 See, e.g., Hinsz & Indahl, supra note 53, at 1001-6; Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina
A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 353 (1999).
5' Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 56.
58 Id. at 360.
59 Id.
60 See Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1286-93.
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Imagine that you are presiding over an automobile accident case in which the parties
have agreed to a bench trial. The plaintiff is a 31-year-old male schoolteacher and
the defendant is a large package-delivery service. The plaintiff was sideswiped by a
truck driven erratically by one of the defendant's drivers. As a result of the accident,
the plaintiff broke three ribs and severely injured his right arm. He spent a week in
the hospital, and missed six weeks of work. The injuries to his right arm were so
severe as to require amputation. (He was right-handed.) 6 1
The judges learned that the truck driver's company admitted fault but dis-
puted compensatory damages. At an unsuccessful pre-trial settlement confer-
ence, some of the judges learned that the plaintiff's lawyer demanded $10
million on behalf of his client, while other judges learned only that the plaintiff
wanted a lot of money. We asked the judges in both conditions to indicate the
amount of compensatory damages they would award.
Consistent with the research on mock jurors, we found that the $10 million
anchor had a significant impact on the judges, as shown in Table 2. In the
control group, judges awarded a mean amount of $808,000 and a median
amount of $700,000; in the experimental group, judges awarded a much larger
mean amount of $2,210,000 and a median amount of $1 million.6 2 Clearly, the
anchor had a significant impact on the judges' decisions.6 3 This is particularly
striking, of course, given that the information disclosed in settlement confer-
ences is inadmissible and therefore inappropriate for the judges to consider at
trial. 64
TABLE 2. ANCHORING RESULTS (SETTILEMENT TALKS) 65
Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Control (37) $ 808,000 $325,000 $ 700,000 $1,000,000
Experimental (38) $2,210,000 $575,000 $1,000,000 $3,000,000
In a second study,66 we tested whether a motion to dismiss would anchor
judges' damages awards. In this study, we presented judges with the following
description of a personal injury case in which only damages were at issue:
Suppose that you are presiding over a personal injury lawsuit that is in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendant is a major company in the package
delivery business. The plaintiff was badly injured after being struck by one of the
defendant's trucks when its brakes failed at a traffic light. Subsequent investigations
revealed that the braking system on the truck was faulty, and that the truck had not
been properly maintained by the defendant. The plaintiff was hospitalized for several
months, and has been in a wheelchair ever since, unable to use his legs. He had been
earning a good living as a free-lance electrician and had built up a steady base of
loyal customers. The plaintiff has requested damages for lost wages, hospitalization,
61 Id. at 1332.
62 Id. at 1290.
63 We also compared a control group of judges to an experimental group of judges who
received a low, rather than a high, anchor, and we found an anchoring effect. Id.
64 Thus, this study is consistent with the studies reported in Part I.A. above, illustrating what
I have called "informational blinders."
65 Id. at 1290.
66 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 790-92.
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and pain and suffering, but has not specified an amount. Both parties have waived
their right to a jury trial.6 7
We randomly assigned the judges to either a control group or an experi-
mental group exposed to an anchor. We provided judges in the control group
with the aforementioned paragraph and asked them, "how much would you
award the plaintiff in compensatory damages?"68 We provided the judges in
the experimental group with the same information. In addition, we informed
the subjects in the experimental group that "[t]he defendant has moved for dis-
missal of the case, arguing that it does not meet the jurisdictional minimum for
a diversity case of $75,000.''69 We asked these judges to rule on the motion,
and then asked them "[i]f you deny the motion, how much would you award
the plaintiff in compensatory damages"?70
Because the plaintiff clearly had incurred damages greater than $75,000,
we viewed the motion as meritless, as did all but two of the judges who ruled
on it. Nonetheless, we hypothesized that the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum
would serve as an anchor, resulting in lower damages awards from those judges
exposed to it. This is what we found. As shown in Table 3, the judges in the
control group awarded the plaintiff, on average, $1,249,000 (and a median
amount of $1 million), while the judges exposed to the anchor awarded the
plaintiff, on average, $882,000 (and a median amount of $882,000).71 By vot-
ing overwhelmingly to deny the motion to dismiss, the judges in the latter
group indicated that the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum contained no reliable
information about the plaintiffs damages. 72 Still, the $75,000 jurisdictional
minimum anchored their awards, as they awarded, on average, roughly
$350,000 (or nearly 30%) less than the control group judges.7 3
TABLE 3. ANCHORING RESULTS (MOTION TO DisMISS)74
Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Control (66) $1,249,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,925,000
Experimental (50) $ 882,000 $288,000 $ 882,000 $1,000,000
2. Hindsight Bias
Hindsight, as we all know, is 20/20. People have a well-documented ten-
dency to overestimate the predictability of past events due to the "hindsight
bias."'75 Hindsight bias occurs because we update our beliefs about the state of
67 Id. at 790.
68 Id. at 790-91.
69 Id. at 791.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 791-92. The difference between the responses of the judges in the two groups was
statistically significant. Id. at 791.
72 Id. at 791-92.
73 Id. at 792.
74 Id.
7' Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight * Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORM-
ANCE 288 (1975) (first documenting the effects of hindsight bias). See also Baruch
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the world when we learn of some outcome, and we then use these updated
beliefs to generate estimates about prior events.7 6 For example, when we learn
that one team has beaten another, we identify reasons why this occurred and
believe the victory was more predictable than it actually was.
Hindsight bias can influence determinations of legal liability, where
judges or juries are called upon to assess the reasonableness of some conduct
after an event has occurred. In one study of a hypothetical negligence case,77
Rachlinski and Kim Kamin instructed some study participants to make deci-
sions in foresight and others to make them in hindsight about taking precau-
tions to protect against a flood. They instructed participants judging in
foresight to recommend that a potentially liable actor take a precaution if the
participants believed that a flood was more than 10% likely to occur in any
given year (which was based on a cost-benefit analysis). They told the subjects
judging in hindsight that the precaution had not been taken and that a flood
causing $1 million in damage had occurred. They instructed these participants
to find the defendant liable for the flood damage if the likelihood of the flood,
from the perspective of the defendant before the fact, was greater than 10% in
any given year.
Although both sets of subjects reviewed identical information about the
likelihood of a flood, they reached different conclusions about appropriate
defendant behavior. Only 24% of foresight subjects concluded that the likeli-
hood of a flood justified taking the precaution, while 57% of the hindsight
subjects concluded that the flood was so likely that the failure to take the pre-
caution was negligent." The decision to refrain from taking the precaution
seemed reasonable to most subjects ex ante, but because of the hindsight bias, it
seemed unreasonable to most subjects ex post.
Courts usually evaluate events after the fact, so they are vulnerable to the
hindsight bias. Besides negligence determinations, the hindsight bias likely
influences claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (decisions a lawyer makes
in the course of representing a criminal defendant can seem less competent
after the defendant has been convicted), the levying of sanctions under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (a motion or allegation seems less meri-
torious after a court rejects it), and assessments of the liability of corporate
officers charged with making false predictions about their company's perform-
ance (which can look like fraud after the predictions fail to come true).7 9
Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
76 See Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After
the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 312-13 (1990).
77 Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995)
78 Id. at 98.
'9 For applications of the hindsight bias to various legal issues, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 602-24
(1998). On hindsight bias and securities fraud in particular, see Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rach-
linski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 773 (2004).
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To demonstrate hindsight bias on the part of judges, Rachlinski, Wistrich,
and I gave them a hypothetical fact pattern based on an actual case, labeled
"Likely Outcome of Appeal":8
In 1991, a state prisoner filed a pro se Section 1983 action in Federal District Court
against the Director of the Department of Criminal Justice in his state, asserting,
among other things, that the prison had provided him with negligent medical treat-
ment in violation of Section 1983. The district court dismissed his complaint on the
ground that the provision of negligent medical care does not violate Section 1983.
The district court further found that the plaintiff knew his claims were not actionable
because he had made similar claims several years earlier in a case that had been
dismissed by the court. Thus, the district court sanctioned the plaintiff pursuant to
Rule 11, ordering him to obtain the permission of the Chief Judge in the district
before filing any more claims. The plaintiff appealed the district court's decision.
81
We randomly assigned the judges to one of three conditions: the
"Affirmed" condition; the "Vacated" condition; or the "Lesser Sanction" condi-
tion. Judges in each learned of a different apparent outcome on appeal:
"Affirmed" - "The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision to impose
this Rule 11 sanction on the plaintiff.",
82
"Vacated" - "The court of appeals found that the district court had abused its discre-
tion and vacated the Rule 11 sanction against the plaintiff."
83
"Lesser Sanction" - "The court of appeals ruled that the district court had abused its
discretion under Rule 11 and remanded the case for imposition of a less onerous Rule
11 sanction against the plaintiff.",
84
We asked the judges in each of the groups to predict which of the three
actions the court of appeals would have been most likely to take: "In light of
the facts of the case, as described in the passage above, which of the following
possible outcomes of the appeal was most likely to have occurred (assume that
the three outcomes below are the only possible ones)?"85 We then listed each
of the three possible outcomes identified above.
Consistent with other research on the hindsight bias, the judges' assess-
ments were influenced by learning the alleged outcome. Judges who learned of
a particular outcome were much more likely than the other judges to identify
that outcome as the most likely to have occurred, as noted in Table 4. Con-
sider, for example, the judges' assessments of the likelihood that the court of
appeals would affirm the district court's decision. Among the judges told that
the court of appeals had affirmed, 81.5% indicated that they would have pre-
dicted that result.86 By contrast, only 27.8% of those told the court of appeals
had vacated, and only 40.4% of those told the court of appeals had remanded
for imposition of a lesser sanction, indicated that they would have predicted an
affirmance.8 7 More generally, the sum of the percentage of judges in each of
80 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 801.
81 Id. at 801-02.
82 Id. at 802.
83 Id
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 802-03.
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the three conditions who identified the outcome they were given as the "most
likely to have occurred" was 172% (rather than 100%, which would have been
technically accurate).88 Learning an outcome clearly influenced the judges' ex
post assessments of the ex ante likelihood of various possible outcomes.89
TABLE 4. HINDSIGHT BIAS RESULTS 90
Percentage selecting as most likely:
"Affirmed" "Vacated" "Lesser sanction"
Affirmed Group (54) 81.5 11.1 7.4
Vacated Group (54) 27.8 51.9 20.4
Lesser Sanction Group (57) 40.4 21.1 38.6
3. Self-Serving Bias
People tend to make judgments about themselves, their abilities, and their
beliefs that are "egocentric" or "self-serving."'" People routinely estimate, for
example, that they are above average on desirable characteristics, including
health,92 driving ability, 93 occupational talent,9 4 and the likelihood of having a
successful marriage.9 5 Additionally, people often overestimate their contribu-
tions to collective activities. Following a conversation, for example, people
will exaggerate their participation; 96 similarly, when married couples are asked
to estimate the percentage of household tasks they perform, their combined
estimates typically exceed 100%, meaning that one or both overestimate their
contribution.97 And people often construe new information they discover in
ways that reinforce their pre-existing opinions, regardless of what those opin-
ions were. 98 In one study, for example, subjects, some of whom favored the
death penalty and some of whom opposed it, learned new information about the
death penalty. Both the pro-death penalty and anti-death penalty subjects con-
88 Id. at 803.
89 The differences in responses among the groups are statistically significant. Id. at 802,
n.119.
90 Id. at 803.
9' See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979).
92 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONAL-
rrv & Soc. PsYcHoL. 806 (1980).
93 See Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 145-46 (1981).
94 See K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching Be Improved?, 17 NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 1, 9-10 (1977).
9' See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
439, 441-43 (1993).
96 Ross & Sicoly, supra note 91, at 324.
97 Id. at 325-26.
98 See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2098, 2102 (1979) (finding that upon learning factual evidence about the death
penalty, subjects' views were reinforced, whether they were pro- or anti-death penalty).
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cluded that the new information bolstered their respective stances on this
issue.99
Self-serving bias can have an unfortunate influence on the litigation pro-
cess.1o0 Due to self-serving bias, litigants, their lawyers, and other stakeholders
might overestimate their own abilities, the quality of their advocacy, and the
relative merits of the positions they, are advocating.' 0 ' These self-serving
assessments, in turn, might thwart reasonable efforts to resolve cases.
In one illustrative study,10 2 Linda Babcock and Greg Pogarsky randomly
assigned student subjects to assume the role of plaintiff or defendant in a hypo-
thetical personal injury case in which the only unresolved issue was the amount
of damages the plaintiff should receive for pain and suffering. They provided
the subjects with substantial information about the case and then asked them to
predict the trial outcome. Plaintiff-subjects estimated that the judge would
award them, on average, $562,222; defendant-subjects, on the other hand, esti-
mated that the judge would award the plaintiff only $400,611, on average. 10 3
In another study, George Loewenstein and colleagues asked undergradu-
ates and law students to assess the value of a tort case in which the plaintiff had
sued the defendant for $100,000 in damages arising from an automobile-motor-
cycle collision.l" These researchers assigned some of them to play the role of
plaintiff and others the role of defendant, but they provided both sets of sub-
jects with identical information about the case. Nevertheless, the subjects inter-
preted the facts in self-serving ways. When asked to predict the amount they
thought the judge would award in the case, the subjects evaluating the case
from the perspective of the plaintiff predicted that the judge would award
$14,527 more than the defendant-subjects predicted. 10 5 When asked to identify
what they perceived to be a fair settlement value, plaintiff-subjects selected a
value $17,709 higher than the value selected by defendant-subjects.'o 6 These
results, like those from the Babcock and Pogarsky study, suggest that self-serv-
ing or egocentric bias can lead to bargaining impasse and inefficient litigation.
Self-serving bias can also influence judges, leading them to believe that
they are better decision makers than is in fact the case. To demonstrate self-
99 Id.
1oo See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. EcON. PERSP., 109, 110-11 (1997); Linda Babcock & Greg
Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 341,
352-54 (1999) [hereinafter Babcock & Pogarsky, Settlement]; George Loewenstein, Samuel
Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 140-55 (1993).
11 See, e.g., Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 100, at 119 (noting that self-serving
biases are likely to be "an important determinant of bargaining impasse"); Babcock & Pogar-
sky, Settlement, supra note 100, at 352-53 (noting that there is "abundant empirical evidence
that individuals consistently exhibit 'self-serving biases' during negotiations").
102 Babcock & Pogarsky, Settlement, supra note 100.
'13 Id. at 363. Even where the researchers informed the subjects that the jurisdiction
imposed a $250,000 cap on pain and suffering damages, they still found self-serving bias. In
that case, plaintiff-subjects predicted that the judge would award, on average, $199,420,
while defendant- subjects predicted the judge would award only $151,982. Id. at 363-64.
"o Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer & Babcock, supra note 100, at 145.
105 Id. at 140.
106 Id.
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serving bias among judges, Rachlinski, Wistrich, and I asked federal magistrate
judges participating in our study to respond to a simple question. In an item
labeled "Appeal Rates,"1 0 7 we asked the judges to estimate their reversal rates
on appeal: "United States magistrate judges are rarely overturned on appeal,
but it does occur. If we were to rank all of the magistrate judges currently in
this room according to the rate at which their decisions have been overturned
during their careers, [what] would your rate be?" We then asked the judges to
place themselves into the quartile corresponding to their respective reversal
rates: highest (> 75%), second-highest (> 50%), third-highest (> 25%), or low-
est (< 25%).
As anticipated, the judges demonstrated self-serving or egocentric bias in
their responses. Of the 155 judges who responded to this question, 56.1%
reported that their reversal rate would place them in the lowest quartile, and
31.6% placed themselves in the second-lowest quartile.' 0 8 In other words,
87.7% of the judges believed that at least half of their peers had higher reversal
rates on appeal.
In a separate study of bankruptcy judges, Ted Eisenberg explored whether
these judges interpreted their behavior in self-serving ways.' 9 To do so, he
relied on survey data in which bankruptcy judges and bankruptcy lawyers
responded to a series of questions about judicial behavior in court,"O and he
speculated that the judges would rate themselves more favorably than the law-
yers on their performance."' For example, two questions asked about the
speed with which judges rule on fee applications. Eisenberg hypothesized that
the "[j]udges would like to be regarded as highly efficient actors in the system,"
which should lead them to perceive "themselves as acting quickly on such fee
applications" relative to the way the lawyers perceived them. 1 2 As shown in
Table 5, this is what he found. One of the two questions asked both bankruptcy
judges and lawyers whether the bankruptcy judges in their districts rule on
interim fee applications: at the hearing, within 30 days after the hearing,
between 31-60 days after the hearing, between 61-120 days after the hearing, or
more than 120 days after the hearing. 1 3 Among judges, 77.6% indicated that
they rule at the hearing, while only 45.5% of lawyers so indicated. 14 The
second question asked both groups whether the bankruptcy judges in their dis-
tricts rule on final fee applications: at the hearing, within 30 days after the
hearing, between 31-60 days after the hearing, between 61-120 days after the
hearing, or more than 120 days after the hearing. Again, the bankruptcy judges
interpreted their behavior more favorably than did the lawyers, indicating that
they rule at the hearing 71.3% of the time relative to 42.5% of the time.' 
15
107 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 813.
10s Id. at 814.
109 Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 979 (1994) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions].
iO Id. at 983-87.
The study also asked about lawyer behavior. See id. at 987-89.
112 Id. at 983.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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When evaluating their behavior, the data show "substantial egocentric biases"
on the part of the judges." 16
TABLE 5. SELF-SERVING BIAS RESULTS"1
7
Interim Final
Judges Lawyers Judges Lawyers
At the hearing 77.6 45.5 71.3 42.5
< 31 days after 18.9 33.7 25.2 35.4
31-60 days after 2.1 16.3 3.5 15.5
61-120 days after 1.4 1.7 0 5
> 121 days after 0 2.8 0 0
4. Summary
This work, along with other work not reported here,." 8 suggests that
judges possess cognitive blinders that can make it difficult for them to make
accurate decisions in court. This means that case outcomes can be influenced
by such phenomena as hindsight bias, which can lead to the assignment of
liability in cases where it might not be appropriate, and anchoring, which can
have an impact on the damages a defendant might have to pay. In other words,
cognitive blinders, like informational blinders, can lead to misjudging.
C. Attitudinal Blinders
Whether elected or appointed, judges come to the bench with political
views. This is not to say that they have pre-committed to positions in particular
cases, but it strains credulity to claim, as, for example, Justice Alito claimed
during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings, that a judge "can't have any
preferred outcome in any particular case." '119 Rather, judges do have opinions,
and these opinions or attitudes can predispose them to rule in ways that are
consistent with those opinions or attitudes.
To establish the presence of attitudinal blinders among judges, political
scientists have developed, and provided empirical evidence to support, the so-
called attitudinal theory or model. 120 Most of this work has focused on the
116 Id. at 982.
117 Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions, supra note 109, at 983.
118 See, e.g., John C. Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M. J. Reckers, Evaluation of
Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. EcoN. PSYCHOL.
711 (1993) (reporting evidence of hindsight bias on the part of judges evaluating auditor
behavior); Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 794-99, 805-11 (demonstrating
that judges are also somewhat susceptible to framing effects and the inverse fallacy); Vis-
cusi, supra note 2 (showing judges are prone to some biases). But see Viscusi, supra note 2,
at 46-55 (finding, among judges attending a law and economics conference, little evidence of
hindsight bias).
119 The Hearing of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. 's Nomination to the Supreme Court, Hearing Before
the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 56 (2006) (opening statement of Judge Samuel Alito).
120 Some of the pioneers include C. Herman Pritchett, Glendon Schubert, David Rohde, and
Harold Spaeth. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-47 (1948) (advancing a judicial behaviorist approach); DAVID
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Supreme Court, but political scientists and legal scholars have also explored
whether judicial attitudes influence judges on the courts of appeals 12 ' and on
the trial bench.12 2 The evidence suggests that attitudinal blinders are an issue
not only at the highest court in the land but also in these lower courts.
123
To examine the impact of attitudinal blinders on trial judges, Robert
Carp, 124 C. K. Rowland, 125 and other scholars of judicial behavior 12 6 have gen-
erally employed the following methods (or something substantially similar):
First, they categorize judges as "Democrats" or "Republicans," typically on the
basis of the party of the President who appointed them.'2 7  Thus judges
appointed by Presidents Nixon or Reagan are coded as Republicans, while
judges appointed by Presidents Carter or Clinton are coded as Democrats. The
ROHDE & HAROLD SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976) (proposing a refined
version of Schubert's original attitudinal model); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND:
ATITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 (1965) (specifying the
first attitudinal model).
This work built on the theorizing of the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s. See, e.g.,
ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 123 (3d ed. 1998) ("By about
the 1920s a whole school of thought had developed that argued that judicial decision making
was as much the product of human, extralegal stimuli as it was of some sort of mechanical
legal thought process. Adherents of this view, who were known as 'judicial realists,'
insisted that judges, like other human beings, are influenced by the values and attitudes
learned in childhood.").
121 See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998) (using attitudinal and strategic theory to
develop a positive account of en banc decision making on the circuit courts); Sheldon
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 374 (1966) (using a variety of variables, including political party affiliation, to
explain circuit judge decision making); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United
States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 491 (1975) (same).
122 See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983) (reporting the results of a study of district court judge
decision making); C. K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FED-
ERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996) (same).
123 CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 120, at 116 ("It is often difficult to determine, in any
given case, the relative weight that any specific influence can have on a judge. Studies have
suggested, though, that when judges, especially trial judges, find no significant precedent to
guide them - that is, when the legal subculture cupboard is bare - they tend to turn to the
democratic subculture, an amalgam of determinants that include their own political
inclinations.").
124 See, e.g., supra note 122.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Robert A. Carp, Donald Songer, C. K. Rowland, Ronald Stidham & Lisa
Richey-Tracy, The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE
298 (1993) (analyzing Bush's appointees through the lens of attitudinal theory); C. K. Row-
land & Bridget Jeffery Todd, Where You Stand Depends on Who Sits: Platform Promises
and Judicial Gatekeeping in the Federal District Courts, 53 J. POL. 175 (1991) (studying the
application of the attitudinal model to standing decisions).
127 Note that party designation might reflect not only ideology but also partisanship, and
each might influence judicial decision making. Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship
from Party in Judicial Research: Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL.
ScI. REV. 413, 413 (1995) ("Partisanship and ideology represent two separate phenomena,
and using party labels solely to represent ideology misses the possible relationship between
an affective, or psychological reference-group identification held by a judge, and the deci-
sions the judge makes.").
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researchers then read case opinions, coding them according to well-established
protocols for subject matter (e.g., "race discrimination") and outcome (e.g.,
"liberal" for a pro-claimant outcome or "conservative" for a pro-defendant out-
come in a race discrimination case). 128 Finally, they compare case outcomes to
determine whether there are meaningful differences between judges appointed
by Republican Presidents and those appointed by Democratic Presidents.
Scholars like Carp and Rowland point to evidence of attitudinal influences if
they find differences in the direction of the outcome of the cases between the
Republican and Democratic appointees. 129
Carp and Rowland published the most ambitious, important, and compre-
hensive studies of district judge decision making, first in 1983,130 and then in
1996.131 In the 1996 version, they assembled a database of 45,826 district
court opinions issued over more than half a century (1933-87), involving more
than 1,500 district court judges. 132 They placed these opinions into one of five
categories 133 and twenty-six subcategories.134 Overall, they found that Demo-
cratic judges ruled in the liberal direction 48% of the time, while Republican
judges ruled in the liberal direction 39% of the time. 1 35 In other words, "using
the odds ratio as our guide, one may say that Democratic judges are 1.42 times
more likely to render a liberal decision than are judges of Republican back-
grounds."'136 The disparity is even greater in civil cases, where Democratic
judges rendered liberal decisions in 56% of the cases and Republican judges in
46% of the cases.
In certain doctrinal areas, they found even more striking differences.
These differences were greatest in cases addressing local economic regulations,
race discrimination claims, and Fourteenth Amendment claims (which include
gender discrimination claims). '3' The differences were more modest in cases
addressing Indian rights claims, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and rent
control claims. 138 And in voting rights cases, Rowland and Carp found Repub-
lican appointees were actually more likely than Democratic appointees to vote
in a "liberal" direction (i.e., in favor of the party asserting a violation of her
voting rights).' 3 9
128 For a thoughtful treatment of what constitutes a "liberal" versus a "conservative" out-
come, see Carp, Songer, Rowland, Stidham, & Richey-Tracy, supra note 126, at 299-300.
129 For an account of these methods, see CARP & ROWLAND, supra note 122, at 14-24;
ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 122, at 17-23.
130 See CARP & ROWLAND, supra note 122.
131 See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 122.
132 Id. at 18.
133 Id. at 22 (criminal justice, government and the economy, support for labor, class dis-
crimination, First Amendment).
134 For a complete listing, see id. at 175-76.
135 Id. at 24-25.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 176.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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TABLE 6. DISTRICT JUDGE DECISION MAKING IN SELECTED
DOCTRINAL AREAS
14 0
% Liberal Decisions
Doctrinal Area Democratic Appointees Republican Appointees
Local Economic Regulation 75 57
Race Discrimination 57 42
Fourteenth Amendment 48 34
Indian Rights 51 49
FLSA 57 55
Rent Control 61 59
Voting Rights 46 50
Attitudinal blinders become even more apparent when one focuses on the
decision-making of the appointees of particular Presidents. As Table 7 illus-
trates, for example, Johnson and Carter appointees rendered liberal decisions in
52% and 53% of cases, respectively. 14 1 By contrast, Reagan and Bush appoin-
tees rendered liberal decisions in only 36% and 34% of cases, respectively.
142
TABLE 7. DISTRICT JUDGE DECISION MAKING BY APPOINTING PRESIDENT
14 3
Appointing President % of Decisions in Liberal Direction
Kennedy (D) 41
Johnson (D) 52
Nixon (R) 39
Ford (R) 44
Carter (D) 53
Reagan (R) 36
Bush (R) 34
And if one compares the decisions of judges appointed by ideologically
distinct Presidents in particular doctrinal areas, the role of attitudinal blinders in
decision making comes into even sharper focus. As Table 8 demonstrates, the
differences between Carter and Reagan appointees in such areas as race dis-
140 Id.
141 Id. at 47.
142 Id. In an update, Carp and his collaborators found that Bush appointees ruled in the
liberal direction in 34% of cases. See Carp, Songer, Rowland, Stidham & Richey-Tracy,
supra note 126, at 299. See also Donald R. Songer, Susan W. Johnson & Ronald Stidham,
Presidential Success Through Appointments to the United States District Courts, 24 JuST.
Sys. J. 283, 290 ("The analysis suggests that [P]residents are quite successful in securing the
selection of district court judges who will support their political preferences. For both civil
liberties and labor and economic cases, the relationships between judicial voting and presi-
dential preferences are strongly positive and significant at the .001 level. The results are
particularly strong for civil liberties cases.").
143 See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 122, at 47.
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crimination, privacy, local economic regulations, and First Amendment claims
(both speech and religion) are dramatic."4
TABLE 8. REAGAN V. CARTER APPOINTEES IN DIFFERENT
DOCTRINAL AREAS' 4 5
% Liberal Decisions
Doctrinal Area Carter Judges Reagan Judges
Race Discrimination 78 18
Right to Privacy 78 45
Local Economic Regulation 81 58
Freedom of Expression 59 39
Criminal Conviction 46 25
Voting Rights 58 36
Fourteenth Amendment 45 26
Freedom of Religion 59 39
Alien Petitions 53 33
Women's Rights 56 36
Union v. Company 61 43
Union Member v. Union 43 28
Indian Rights 56 40
U.S. Commercial Regulation 77 65
U.S. Habeas Corpus 37 25
Criminal Court Motions 44 31
Employee v. Employer 45 33
Rights of the Disabled 58 46
Age Discrimination 50 40
State Habeas Corpus 31 24
NLRB v. Employer (FLSA) 68 63
Environmental Protection 65 61
NLRB v. Union 63 60
"4 The distinctions between Republican and Democratic appointees extend from substan-
tive outcomes to procedural decisions. In an illuminating study of attitudinal blinders, Row-
land and Bridget Jeffery Todd studied standing decisions in the federal trial courts. Rowland
& Todd, supra note 126. Among other things, they found that Reagan appointees, relative to
Carter and Nixon appointees, were much more resistant to "underdog" claimants seeking
standing:
[F]or the Reagan cohort, where you stand depends in large measure on who you are .... [T]he
Reagan appointees who resisted upperdog access only 41% of the time resist underdog claims
78% of the time. These differences mean that the Reagan gatekeepers are almost twice as vigi-
lant when underdogs seek standing as they are when upperdogs claim standing, and they are
about 60% more resistant to underdog standing than the Carter or Nixon cohorts, which are
virtually indistinguishable.
Id. at 181.
145 Id. at 49.
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Two important limitations of these studies are worth noting. First, and
most significantly, Rowland and Carp used published opinions from the Fed-
eral Supplement to build their database.' 46 Because district judges publish only
a fraction of their opinions,14 7 and because there is reason to believe that cases
resulting in published opinions are among the more discretionary and policy-
oriented cases that judges hear,"4 8 the opinions published in the Federal Sup-
plement are not representative of the full body of case decisions that trial
judges make.' 4 9 Thus, as Rowland and Carp readily acknowledge, there may
be meaningful selection effects in their database.' 5 ° Second, because Rowland
and Carp coded only those case types that could readily be classified as liberal
or conservative,' 5 ' they necessarily excluded many published opinions that
could not be so easily categorized. Indeed, they estimate that they excluded as
many published opinions as they included in their sample.
152
Despite these limitations, and the more general limitations of attitudinal
theory,15 3 Rowland and Carp's studies provide insight into judicial decision
146 ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 122, at 18. But see id. at 117-35 (exploring appointment
effects on unpublished opinions, relying on case samples from Kansas City and Detroit).
' See, e.g., id. at 20 (acknowledging that "only a small percentage of district court deci-
sions are ever formally published").
148 See, e.g., id. at 19 ("[T]he best evidence suggests that, although not all discretionary
policy decisions are codified and published, the vast majority of published opinions are
explications of discretionary policy decisions that directly or indirectly allocate value beyond
the litigants of record.").
"9 See, e.g., id. at 20 ("During the past decade several scholars have compared published
with unpublished opinions in several diverse areas of the law and have concluded that there
are real and substantive differences between the two types of cases.").
'5o See generally id. at 18-21, 117-35.
151 Id. at 18 ("Only those cases were used that fit easily into one of twenty-six case types
which appeared to contain a clear underlying liberal-conservative dimension.").
152 Id.
"I For all of the virtues of the attitudinal model, Rowland and Carp acknowledge its weak-
nesses, particularly when applied to trial judges (as opposed to Supreme Court justices). See
id. at 145-146 ("The main difficulty in applying the attitudinal model to trial judges is its
fundamental assumption that these jurists are motivated primarily by their personal policy
preferences .... [T]o say that Supreme Court justices are motivated primarily by their
constitutional policy preferences and that these preferences can be inferred from their 'votes'
is fundamentally different from contending that trial judges' fact-finding or evidence evalua-
tion is motivated by their personal preferences.").
Thus, they propose a social-cognitive model of trial judge decision making. Id. at 156
(borrowing from "cognitive psychology, social cognition, and social judgment theory to
build a cognitive theory of trial judges' judgments"). Their proposed model acknowledges
the role attitudes can play, but it also takes into account the cognitive processes judges use to
make judgments:
[W]e proffer a conceptual model of judicial cognition. The model adopts from prospect theory
[a descriptive theory of decision making that proposes a two-stage process of editing and then
evaluating options] the notion that decision making is a two-stage process in which decisions are
preceded by framing, that is, the mental transformation of ambiguous evidence and law into
proximate decision cues. It also shares with prospect theory the assumption that all humans,
including judges, have computational limitations that constrain the quality and quantity of their
judgment protocols. And it accepts the behavioral premise that judges' policy preferences can
influence their judgments. However, our model of judicial cognition rejects the general assump-
tion that human judgment is necessarily goal-oriented and the axiomatic assumption of attitudi-
nal models and their derivatives that judicial judgment is motivated by the judge's personal
Spring 2007]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
making at the trial court level. Their work - along with the work of other
scholars of judicial behavior'5 4 - suggests that attitudinal blinders can play a
meaningful role in the decision making of trial judges, particularly in those
instances where the judges have discretion and where the issues confronting
them are politically salient.
This paper takes as a given that trial judges seek to make accurate deci-
sions under the law; according to this view, judges try hard to get it right but
are occasionally influenced by their attitudes or deeply held beliefs. It is worth
noting that attitudinal theorists generally assume that judges are, in fact,
"rational actors" seeking to maximize their policy preferences or attitudes.' 55
For them, judges are not blinded by their attitudes; rather, judges consciously
make decisions to further those attitudes,1 56 subject to external constraints like
the threat of reversal. Whether my assumption is right, or the attitudinalist
assumption is right, is irrelevant here. In either case, judicial attitudes can lead
to misjudging.
II. FORUM-SELECTION IMPLICATIONS
Judges possess informational blinders, cognitive blinders, and attitudinal
blinders. Largely unacknowledged by the legal system, these blinders increase
the likelihood of misjudging. Courts of appeals exist in large part to remedy
judicial error, 157 but they cannot fully address the misjudging problem because
appeals are available only on limited bases,' 5 8 occur infrequently,1 5 9 and sel-
dom lead to reversal.' 6 ° Moreover, from the perspective of the litigants
policy preferences. A judicial cognition model must rather attend to the process by which prefer-
ences influence judgment in the context of principal-agent relationships between federal trial and
appellate judges.
Id. at 158. For more on prospect theory and its two-stage approach to decision making, see
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274-77 (1979).
154 See, e.g., sources cited in note 126, supra.
155 See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking in U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1646-55 (1998) (describing the development of
the attitudinal model).
156 Id.
157 See sources cited in note 5, supra.
158 ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 122, at 24; Maurice Rosenberg, Standards of Review, in
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS 30, 31 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (explaining that in many
instances "the court of appeals [is] obliged by established standards to affirm unless, for
example, crucial fact findings were not merely in error but clearly so," and, likewise, that
"[d]iscretionary rulings [have] to be not merely incorrect, but abusive").
159 See, e.g., ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 122, at 8 (observing that "only about 20 percent
of all district court cases are appealed in any given year"); Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal
Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff
Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 685 ("About 20 percent of cases
with definitive trial court judgments generate appeals, with tried cases appealed at about
twice the rate of nontried cases.") [hereinafter Eisenberg, Appeal Rates].
160 See, e.g., ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 122, at 8 ("[M]ost appeals are unsuccessful,
and, as anticipated by the expanded fact freedom inherent in the evolution of fiduciary juris-
prudence, the reversal rate is declining. For example, the reversal rate in 1960 was almost
25 percent; by 1990 it had declined to 16 percent. In combination, the low rates of appeal
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involved in a case, appeals, even if successful, add unwanted costs and delays
to the dispute resolution process.
Because the prospect of misjudging is real - due not only to the blinders I
have described in this paper but also due to "bad judging,"' 16 1 electoral con-
cerns, 162 desire for promotion, 163 and other non-legal factors"6 - disputants
and their lawyers should not assume that they will obtain predictable outcomes
in court. Informational, cognitive, and attitudinal blinders, along with the other
factors noted above, decrease the likelihood that judges will accurately apply
the governing law to the relevant facts of the case.
and reversal ensure that only a very small number of district courts' judgments will be
reversed on appeal - about 3 percent (.20 x .16 = .032)."); Margaret A. Berger, When, If
Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 893, 894-
96 (1992) (finding in 1990 that only 30 trial verdicts were reversed for evidentiary error in
the federal courts); Eisenberg, Appeal Rates, supra note 159, at 665 (emphasis in original)
("4.3 percent of the 2.1 million district court filings ended with an appellate court affirming
the trial court and ... 1.3 percent of such filings ended with an appellate court reversing the
trial court. Thus, in rounded figures, 1 filing in 100 yields an appellate reversal. Simple
computation reveals that about one-quarter of 1 percent of all cases filed from 1987 through
1995 led to an appellate court reversal of a trial outcome and that about one-half of 1 percent
of such filed cases led to an appellate court affirmance of a trial outcome."); Chris Guthrie &
Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights Into the 'Affirmance Effect'
on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA ST. U.L. REV. 357, 358, 359 (2005) (arguing
that "affirmances are a defining feature of the courts of appeals" and reporting data to that
effect).
161 See Miller, supra note 8.
162 See, e.g., Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. Sci. 247, 261 (2004) ("We provide
evidence that judges become significantly more punitive the closer they are to standing for
reelection. In Pennsylvania, for the time period and crimes we analyze, we can attribute
more than two thousand years of additional incarceration to this dynamic. This may imply
judges sentence too harshly near elections, or too leniently early in their terms. In either
case, it implies a downside to electoral control of judges.").
163 See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences
on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377,
1487-93 (1998) (finding evidence that promotion prospects had some influence on district
judge decisions in cases challenging the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guide-
lines) [hereinafter Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Charting]. See also Mark A. Cohen, Explaining
Judicial Behavior or What's 'Unconstitutional' About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 183, 192 (1991) (same).
164 See, e.g., CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 122, at 125 (observing that "personal factors -
such as religion, sex, race, pre-judicial career, and the level of prestige of their law school
education - may also play a role" in decision making, although "only political party affilia-
tion seems to have any significant and consistent" explanatory force); Tracey E. George,
Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 37 (2001) (providing an overview of the empirical
research documenting the relationship, if any, between personal attributes, social back-
ground, and policy preferences on judicial behavior, particularly the behavior of appellate
judges); Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Charting, supra note 163, at 1470-80 (finding evidence that
prior employment background influenced federal district judge reactions to initial challenges
to the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise
& Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical
Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 614 (2004) ("In our study of
religious freedom decisions [among district judges and circuit judges], the single most prom-
inent, salient, and consistent influence on judicial decisionmaking was religion - religion in
terms of affiliation of the claimant, the background of the judge, and the demographics of the
community.").
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This observation has important implications for disputants and their law-
yers because it calls into question the still-dominant assumption that the court-
house is the proper locus of dispute resolution. Indeed, the prospect of
misjudging suggests that disputants might prefer other dispute resolution fora
for three related reasons, each of which I advance below. First, because court
outcomes are uncertain, disputants might opt for consensual dispute resolution
processes as a way of removing the risk that they will be subject to binding, and
potentially erroneous, decisions. Second, recognizing that accuracy is often
elusive in court, disputants might decide to place a priority on other values in
disputing, like self-determination, creativity, improved relationships, speedier
and cheaper resolutions, and so forth. Consensual processes, like negotiation
and mediation (and perhaps even some non-consensual processes, like arbitra-
tion), are more likely than litigation to enable disputants to give expression to
these values. Third, if accuracy remains the disputants' primary goal, some
processes other than litigation, including some forms of arbitration, might offer
disputants more hope than litigation itself. 165
A. Avoiding Erroneous Decisions
Courts impose binding decisions on the disputants who appear in front of
them. Because the research on misjudging suggests that judges struggle to
make fully accurate decisions, disputants might opt for consensual dispute reso-
lution processes in order to avoid the possibility of facing potentially erroneous,
but nonetheless binding, decisions in court. 1 6 6 In consensual processes like
negotiation, mediation, and collaborative lawyering, disputants do not submit
their dispute to a third party decision maker; rather, they retain responsibility
for identifying, selecting, and rejecting the terms of any settlement. By seeking
to resolve their disputes through such consensual processes, they avoid the risk
that they will face a loss in court due to misjudging.
It is true, of course, that the disputants themselves are likely to be influ-
enced by the very same blinders (as well as some others) that influence judges.
There is a rich research literature demonstrating that disputants 167 (and, to a
165 In our earlier work, Rachlinski, Wistrich, and I identified several implications following
from the research on what I am calling informational and cognitive blinders in this paper.
With respect to the former, we argued that courts might benefit from bifurcating judicial
roles; that jury trials might be preferable to bench trials; and that damage schedules might be
appropriate in civil cases. See Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1325-29.
With respect to the latter, we argued that judges might take steps to improve their judgment;
that jury trials might be preferable to bench trials; and that the legal system can adopt, and
has adopted in some cases, legal rules that minimize the impact of cognitive blinders. See
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 821-29. We have not addressed the impact
of this research on dispute resolution forum selection, which is what I focus on here.
166 Of course, a disputant who believes a judge will make an inaccurate decision - but one
that favors her position - is quite likely to opt for trial over other processes.
167 See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Percep-
tions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 289, 296-97 (1995) (finding
that framing effects influenced non-lawyer and lawyer subjects); Chris Guthrie, Panacea or
Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 IowA L. REV. 601 (2003) [herein-
after Guthrie, Options] (reporting evidence that prospective disputants are influenced by
such phenomena as contrast and compromise); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psycho-
logical Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107
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lesser extent, their lawyers' 68) are susceptible to cognitive blinders, which can
lead them to make suboptimal decisions. 169 But there is a marked difference
between making an erroneous decision and being subject to someone else's
erroneous decisions. In consensual processes like negotiation and mediation,
the disputants might err, but they will not find themselves at the mercy of an
error committed by a decision maker empowered by the state to impose that
erroneous outcome on them.
Given that so few cases are tried, 170 and so many cases settle,' 7 ' one
might argue that disputants pursuing litigation are effectively resolving their
disputes through consensual processes anyway. Although this is certainly true
- and, according to most, desirable 172 - the fact is that litigated disputes typi-
(1994) (finding that psychological barriers influence prospective litigants in hypothetical
suits).
168 See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 167, at 296-97 (finding that framing effects influ-
enced non-lawyer and lawyer subjects); Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions, supra note 109
(finding evidence of self-serving bias among lawyers); Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Fore-
casting Trial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher Probability to Possibilities That Are
Described in Greater Detail, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (2002) (demonstrating decision-
making biases when assessing probabilities). But see Guthrie, Options, supra note 167, at
642 (reporting evidence showing that lawyers appear to be less susceptible to contrast effects
than non-lawyers); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settle-
ment: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997) (finding evidence
that lawyers were less susceptible to psychological biases than non-lawyers); Jean R. Ster-
nlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology
to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269
(1999) (arguing that lawyers can use insights from research on cognitive blinders to serve
their clients better as advocates).
169 Some scholars have argued that mediators might be able to help disputants' overcome
cognitive blinders in disputing. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a
Mediator For?": Mediation's "Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 1, 12-13 (1996).
"I See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461, 463 (2004) (reporting
that trials accounted for only 1.8% of all case dispositions in U.S. district courts in 2002);
Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Examining Trial Trends
in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 768, 769 (2004) (finding,
based on a review of data from twenty-two state courts, that 0.6% of civil case dispositions
were jury trials and 15% were bench trials).
171 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 170, at 515 ("For a long time, the great majority of cases
of almost every kind in both federal and state courts have terminated by settlement."); Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settle-
ments, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (noting that roughly two-thirds of cases settle).
But see Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudi-
cations, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 733 (2004) (tentatively reporting, based on adjusted data from
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, that "the overall settlement rate (including
consent judgments) was six percentage points lower in 2000 than in 1970").
172 Sam Gross and Kent Syverud articulate the conventional view:
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know
that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With
some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is
almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by
the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial.
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cally settle late, 173 and often after judges have had the opportunity to rule on
pretrial matters, including procedural motions, evidentiary motions, discovery
disputes, and so on.' 7 4 When making these pretrial decisions, judges are sus-
ceptible to the distortions that informational, cognitive, and attitudinal blinders
can cause. Because disputants in litigation often settle in the shadow of legal
rulings, 175 agreements reached while immersed in the litigation process might
very well reflect the potentially distorted judgment of a judge. This suggests
that disputants might benefit not only by pursuing consensual dispute resolution
processes but also by doing so before a complaint has even been filed.
176
B. Pursuing Other Values
Trial involves a search for the truth. But if informational, cognitive, and
attitudinal blinders lead judges to misjudge - perhaps by inducing them to grant
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and
the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mica. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991). For detractors, see Paul
Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 627,
629-35 (2004) (defending trial based on such "intangible benefits" as citizen education and
reaffirmation of democratic values); Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24-32 (2000) (defending litigation and trial based in large part on a
public goods argument); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (artic-
ulating the classic case against settlements); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 171 (challenging
the superiority of settlements); Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An
Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J.
619 (2006) (challenging the efficiency arguments made on behalf of settlement).
173 See, e.g., William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 367, 367 (1999) ("Over my first ten years as a lawyer handling civil litigation I
noticed that in many of my cases the first serious settlement discussions took place shortly
before trial. This was not good."); Rhee, supra note 172, at 622 ("Cases do not settle early
when transaction cost savings would be the greatest. They settle in mid-litigation when
previous settlement attempts, on roughly similar terms, have failed. Still many others settle
late when most transaction costs have become sunk costs."). But see Charles Silver, Does
Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2109-2110 (2002) (reporting, based on
a study of state courts, that a reasonably high percentage of simple disputes is resolved fairly
early in the litigation process, although the average contract case was resolved thirteen
months into litigation and the average torts case 19.3 months into litigation).
174 See, e.g., Stephen Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 593
(2004) (observing a substantial increase in recent years in the percentage of cases resolved
by summary judgment); Galanter, supra note 170, at 481 ("Interestingly, although the num-
ber and rate of trials has fallen, judicial involvement in case activity - at least on some level
- has increased."); Hadfield, supra note 171, at 733 (tentatively reporting, based on adjusted
data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, a significant increase in "nontrial
adjudication" and arguing that we may be observing "a shift in the way judges decide cases,
away from full-scale trial adjudication toward more piecemeal nontrial adjudication").
175 Hadfield, supra note 171, at 708 (noting that settlements "are negotiated in the shadow
of a trial or in the shadow of a pretrial motion"). See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979).
176 Of course, most disputants, most of the time, resolve their disputes without filing a
complaint or even hiring a lawyer. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances,
Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'v REV. 525, 544
(1981) (reporting that of every 1000 grievances, only 103 involve lawyers and 50 involve
court filings).
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a motion that should be denied; to deny a motion that should be granted; to
assign responsibility to the wrong party; or to award too much or too little in
damages - the truth-seeking function of trial can be compromised. The
research on misjudging reported above suggests that there is a risk that this
might happen.
Once disputants and their lawyers acknowledge the risk that litigation
might not produce fully accurate liability and damages determinations, they
might reasonably conclude that they should pursue other values in the disputing
process (unless, of course, they believe that judicial error is likely to favor them
in the litigation). 77 Proponents of consensual dispute resolution processes like
negotiation and mediation have long argued that these processes are preferable
to trial precisely because they enable disputants to vindicate such values as self-
determination;"' party satisfaction;"' speedy resolutions; 80 cost savings;18
177 As noted above, if disputants conclude that they will fare better as a result of the judge's
erroneous decision, they might pursue litigation for that very reason. See supra note 166.
178 See, e.g., Bush, supra note 169, at 18-19 (arguing that mediation provides disputants
with "process control" or "the opportunity for meaningful participation in determining the
outcome of the procedure (whatever it may ultimately be) and the opportunity for full self-
expression"); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of
Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 88 (1998) [hereinafter Kovach & Love, Mapping
Mediation] (arguing that facilitative mediation enhances self-determination, which is "the
fundamental goal of mediation"); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 29, 33-35 (1982) [hereinafter Riskin, Mediation] (noting that in mediation "the ultimate
authority resides with the disputants"); Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIo
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 909, 918 (1998) (arguing that mediation "provides parties with ... a
greater opportunity to participate directly in resolving these disputes"); Nancy A. Welsh, The
Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price
of Institutionalization?, 6 HAv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (observing that mediation
relies "on the parties' active and direct participation in the process and in decision-making"
and therefore gives participants "a means to wrest control over both the dispute resolution
process and the dispute resolution outcome from judges and lawyers").
179 For a summary of the then-extant literature, see Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party
Satisfaction" Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 885, 887-98 (1998). See also Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really
Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376,
377 (1997) ("It appears that ADR processes, especially mediation, do consistently result in
increased litigant satisfaction."); Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative
Dispute Resolution: A Closer, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
211 (2004) (showing through experimental methods that ex ante disputants prefer mediation
to other dispute resolution methods).
180 See, e.g., Craig McEwen, Mediation in Context: New Questions for Research, 3 DisP.
RESOL. MAG. 16, 16 (1996) (reporting that research shows that mediation results in a "reduc-
tion in typical settlement times when agreements are reached but delays when they are not");
Riskin, Mediation, supra note 178, at 32-35 (observing that mediation often delivers "speedy
processing" and is "faster" than adversary processes); Stulberg, supra note 178, at 918
(observing that courts have successfully established mediation programs to facilitate speedy
processing). But see McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 179, at 377 ("Recent studies, however,
do not always appear to support the claims that ADR produces substantially quicker settle-
ments . ").
181 See, e.g., McEwen, supra note 180, at 16 (reporting that there is "some evidence of cost-
savings to parties as a result of mediation"); Riskin, Mediation, supra note 178, at 33-35
(observing that mediation often saves disputants time and money and is "cheaper" than
adversary processes); Stulberg, supra note 178 at 918 (observing that courts have success-
fully established mediation programs to reduce costs). But see McAdoo & Welsh, supra
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creative agreements that truly meet their needs;182 enhancing the relationship
between the parties; 18 3 and equipping the parties to resolve future disputes on
their own. 18
4
Some consensual processes, like "facilitative" mediation, are more likely
than other consensual processes, like "evaluative" mediation,' 85 to enhance
pursuit of these values. 186 In facilitative mediation, mediators help the parties
"resolve their own disputes, listen to each other differently, broaden their own
capacities for understanding and collaboration, and create resolutions that build
relationships, generate more harmony, and are 'win-win.' ' ' 187 Facilitative
mediators may "push disputing parties to question their assumptions, reconsider
their positions, and listen to each other's perspectives, stories, and argu-
ments," ' 88 but they may not offer "an opinion or judgment as to the likely
note 179, at 377 ("Recent studies, however, do not always appear to support the claims that
ADR produces ... reduced expenses for litigants or the courts.").
182 See, e.g., Riskin, Mediation, supra note 178, at 33-35 (arguing that mediation is "poten-
tially more hospitable to unique solutions that take more fully into account nonmaterial inter-
ests of the disputants"); Frank E. A. Sander, Some Concluding Thoughts, 17 OHIo ST. J. ON
Disp. REsOL. 705, 709 (2002) [hereinafter Sander, Thoughts] (reporting that mediation and
interest-based negotiation are more likely to "focus on creating value and reaching Pareto-
optimal solutions").
183 See, e.g., Riskin, Mediation, supra note 178, at 33-35 (observing that mediation can help
parties "learn to work together and to see through cooperation both can make positive
gains").
184 See, e.g., Sander, Thoughts, supra note 182, at 709 (noting that a skillful mediator seeks
"to teach the parties how to handle future disputes"); Welsh, supra note 178, at 17-18 (argu-
ing that mediation provides disputants with "a sense of their own value and strength and own
capacity to handle life's problems"). See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P.
Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Rec-
ognition (1994).
185 For the classic explanation of the distinction between facilitative and evaluative media-
tion, see Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Tech-
niques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13 (1996) [hereinafter Riskin,
Grid] (attempting to "categorize the various approaches to mediation" through use of a
"grid"). See also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 111 (1994) [hereinafter Riskin, Mediator Orientations]
(same). But see John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839, 850 n.40 (1997) (arguing that "it is more useful to think
of this as a continuum rather than a discrete dichotomy"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond For-
malism and False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing A Flexible Concept of the
Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 949, 952 (1997) (arguing that "the view that
mediators act as either facilitators or evaluators represents a triumph of excessively formalist
thinking at a time when effective dispute resolution law and policy require a functional
approach"); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations:
Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 986 (1997) (calling Riskin's
"facilitative/evaluative dichotomy" a "false one").
For a more recent attempt by Riskin to capture approaches to mediation, see Leonard L.
Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003).
186 For support, see, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is
an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996); Kovach & Love, Mapping
Mediation, supra note 178; Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 (1997).
187 Love, supra note 186, at 943-44.
188 Id. at 939.
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outcome or a 'fair' or correct resolution of an issue in a dispute."' 89 In evalua-
tive mediation, by contrast, mediators try not only to facilitate party communi-
cation but also to provide the parties with information and opinions about the
substance of the dispute. An "evaluative mediator assumes that the participants
want and need the mediator to provide some direction as to the appropriate
grounds for settlement - based on law, industry practice or technology."' 90 In
evaluative mediation, in other words, mediators help the parties bargain in the
shadow of the law by providing them with case evaluations.
The research on misjudging suggests that evaluative mediators are
unlikely to make accurate predictions about case outcomes. Of course, predict-
ing case outcomes accurately is difficult, even if one assumes away the blinders
described in this paper. 91 But when one takes these blinders into account, it
becomes clear how difficult case evaluation really is because these blinders (at
least the informational and cognitive ones) 192 can influence not only the judges
whose decisions the mediators are trying to predict but also the mediators them-
selves. These flawed evaluations, in turn, are likely to influence the behavior
of the disputants,1 93 leading them to settle on the basis of the flawed evalua-
tions rather than on the basis of other important values (or on the basis of
accurate evaluations). 194
89 Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 178, at 75 ("The mediator should not
'answer' the question posed by the dispute (i.e., what is a fair, just, or likely court outcome).
That job belongs to the parties.").
190 Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 185, at 111.
191 See, e.g., Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation: Concerns About the
Nature and Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 267, 288
(2001) (reporting that available data "displays the difficulty of predicting litigation outcomes
- giving cause for concern about the quality of evaluative opinions by mediators."); Rhee,
supra note 172, at 642 (observing that attorneys often lack the trial experience necessary to
make good predictions about court outcomes); id. at 21 (observing that because the facts of
any given legal case are unique, no data exists from which to make good predictions about
court outcomes); id. at 30 (arguing that "[c]ase assessments cannot be quantified").
192 The attitudinal blinders, by contrast, might make a particular judge's ruling more pre-
dictable, at least in cases with a clear ideological dimension.
193 See, e.g., Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 178, at 100 ("The exact
impact of actions and words is unknowable. If a precondition to giving an evaluation is
determining that an evaluation will be 'non-directive' or will not interfere with self-determi-
nation, the safest and wisest course is to give no evaluation at all."); Love, supra note 186, at
943 (arguing, for example, that "[t]he mediator's opinion that one of the parties... does not
have standing to bring a particular claim in court carries enormous weight.").
194 The emerging empirical literature suggests that parties prefer facilitative mediation to
evaluative mediation. See E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, "What's Going On" in
Mediation: An Empirical Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator's Style on Party Satisfac-
tion and Monetary Benefit, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 97 (2004) (finding, based on an
analysis of EEOC mediations, that "while all forms of mediation had high participant satis-
faction ratings, the purely facilitative mediation is most satisfactory to the charging party.");
Shestowsky, supra note 179, at 245-46 (reporting experimental evidence suggesting that
disputants prefer facilitative to evaluative mediation). But see McDermott & Obar, supra at
97 (identifying a National Institute of Justice survey showing that mediator style did not
influence party evaluations). However, there is also some evidence showing that charging
parties fared better in EEOC mediations when the mediators were evaluative rather than
facilitative. Id. at 101.
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In short, because litigation cannot promise perfectly accurate and fully
predictable outcomes, disputants might opt for consensual dispute resolution
processes as a way of pursuing other important values in disputing. These
processes, particularly those that are consciously conducted outside the shadow
of the law, may give disputants a way to vindicate the very values that litigation
can thwart.
C. Seeking Enhanced Accuracy
Even though perfectly accurate outcomes are elusive, in court or else-
where, some disputants will nonetheless place a primacy on obtaining an accu-
rate resolution of their disputes. Arbitration might enhance their chances of
doing so.
At first glance, this seems unlikely. After all, arbitration is essentially
private litigation. In both arbitration and litigation, a third-party decision
maker is empowered, either by the state or by the disputants themselves, to
render a binding decision. This suggests, of course, that an arbitrator, like a
judge, is susceptible to informational, cognitive, and attitudinal blinders, and
that arbitrators are as prone to "misarbitrating" as judges are to "misjudg-
ing."'195 By implication, then, parties in arbitration are as likely as parties in
litigation to face a binding decision shaped by non-merits based factors, like the
blinders identified above.
On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that arbitration might
nonetheless hold the promise of greater accuracy and predictability. Arbitra-
tion, in contrast to litigation, frequently requires participants to appear in front
of a panel of arbitrators rather than an individual arbitrator.196 Panel or group
decision makers might be better able to avoid the cognitive blinders that can
undermine individual decision making.
The evidence on the relative susceptibility of groups and individuals to
cognitive blinders is decidedly mixed.1 97 There is at least a hint in the litera-
191 In a 2004 article, Chris Drahozal surveyed the then-extant empirical literature and
argued that arbitrators are more likely to make decisions like judges than jurors, though
noting the paucity of empirical evidence on this point. See Christopher R. Drahozal, A
Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 107 (2004).
196 See, e.g., Rule 607(a)(1) of the NYSE Arbitration Rules, http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/
NYSERules/ (select "Arbitration Rules"; then scroll to Rule 607) (last visited Feb. 18,
2007) (requiring appointment of at least three panel members in any controversy over
$10,000 or "where the matter in controversy does not involve or disclose a money claim");
Rule 10308(b)(1)(B) of the NASD Rules, http://nasd.complinet.com (select "Procedural
Rules"; then select "10300. Uniform Code of Arbitration"; then scroll to Rule 10308) (last
visited Feb. 18, 2006) (requiring the appointment of a panel of three arbitrators if the amount
in dispute is greater than $50,000).
197 See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in Judgment:
Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 713 (1996) ("The central
question of this paper has been, 'Which is more likely to make a biased judgment, individu-
als or groups?' Our overview of the relatively small and diverse empirical literature sug-
gested that there was no simple empirical answer to this question."); Norbert L. Kerr, Keith
E. Niedermeier & Martin F. Kaplan, Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries: New Evidence from
the SDS Perspective, 80 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 70, 83
(1999) (noting that "the relative susceptibility of individuals vs groups to judgmental biases
will depend on a variety of task, group, and group member factors").
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ture, though, that group decision makers might be better equipped to combat
some of the more pernicious cognitive blinders, like hindsight bias.' 9s One of
the reasons hindsight bias occurs is that, when people learn of an outcome, their
memories of prior events are altered. They remember information consistent
with the known outcome better than information inconsistent with that out-
come. Because groups usually remember more of the relevant facts than indi-
viduals and because group members can deliberate with one another, they
might be better able to remember information that is inconsistent with the
alleged outcome, thereby enabling them to avoid some of the hindsight bias's
influence.199 This suggests that arbitration might yield more accurate determi-
nations than bench trials.2°°
Relatedly, a panel of arbitrators might be less susceptible to attitudinal
blinders than an individual judge. When facing a bench trial, disputants con-
front a single decision maker, endowed with her own set of attitudes. As
described above, the literature demonstrates that attitudinal blinders sometimes
influence the way individual judges decide cases, at least in cases with a clear
ideological dimension.20 ' Assuming that an arbitration panel contains mem-
bers with diverse views - and this seems plausible, particularly in those cases
where each disputant selects one of the panelists20 2 - it seems reasonable to
speculate that the panel might attenuate the influence of individual attitudinal
blinders on the outcome. Although there is reason to suspect that a panel of
arbitrators is less likely than an individual judge to be influenced by attitudinal
blinders, I do not want to push this argument too far. There is ample evidence
demonstrating that attitudinal blinders influence outcomes on multi-member
courts, like the U.S. Courts of Appeals2 03 and the Supreme Court.2° 4 And it is
198 See Kerr, MacCoun & Kramer, supra note 197, at 692 (summarizing the scant literature
to date and reporting that groups appear "slightly less susceptible than individuals" to the
hindsight bias).
199 See Dagmar Stahlberg, Frank Eller, Anne Maass & Dieter Frey, We Knew It All Along:
Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 46,
51-55, 56 (1995) (finding no difference between individuals and groups in one study but
marginally greater hindsight bias on the part of individuals in another study and concluding
that "groups are as prone to hindsight bias as individuals when making hypothetical predic-
tions", but "[wihen asked to recall previous decisions ...groups apparently have better
access to their previous judgments .... " which suggests that "group discussion may often
have a corrective effect on social judgment biases."). But see Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly,
Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in Learning from Experience, 31
ACAD. MGMT. J. 628 (1998) (finding generally that group discussion had essentially no
impact on the hindsight bias of individuals).
200 As Rachlinski, Wistrich, and I have observed elsewhere, this argument might also apply
to juries. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 827.
201 See supra, Part II.C.
202 See, e.g., Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs:
Constructing International Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Dis-
putes, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 27, 31 (1995) ("The arbitrators are private individuals selected
by the parties, and usually there are three arbitrators. The parties each select one, and the
parties jointly, the arbitrators, or an institutional appointing authority select the third.").
203 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91
CAL. L. REv. 1459, 1459 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman,
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L.
REV. 301 (2004).
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certainly true that a panel of like-minded arbitrators, like any other group, is
susceptible to polarization and intensification of individual attitudes.2 °5
Finally, in many areas, like securities, labor, and construction, the arbitra-
tors who hear those cases are subject-matter experts, rather than general-pur-
pose judges. In our earlier work, Rachlinski, Wistrich, and I argued that
"[g]reater experience, training, and specialization should enable judges to make
better decisions. ' '206 Likewise, arbitrators, by virtue of their specialized sub-
ject-matter knowledge, might be better able than general jurisdiction judges to
make accurate decisions, suggesting, again, that arbitration might be preferable
to litigation.2 ° 7
There are, of course, countervailing arguments. Unless an arbitrator has
substantive expertise in the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitrator is less
likely than a judge to know the governing law. Moreover, arbitrators, in con-
trast to judges, are market players often selected by parties; this might influence
arbitrators' decisions, prompting them to favor repeat-player disputants (from
whom they are more likely to get repeat business) 20 8 or to propose "split-the-
baby" outcomes (as a way of placating the disputants on both sides of the
dispute)., 0 9
Still, there is reason to believe that disputants seeking an accurate outcome
might fare better in arbitration, particularly where the arbitration involves a
diverse panel of subject-matter experts. In this paper, I have focused on the
potential advantages of arbitration panels; in earlier work, Rachlinski, Wistrich,
and I explored the potential advantages of juries.2 10 Some of the arguments in
204 For the classic treatment, see C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A
STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE
JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963
(1965).
205 See, e.g., David G. Myers & Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83
PSYCHOL. BULL. 602 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (2000) (according to group polarization theory, "members of
a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated
by the members' predeliberation tendencies").
206 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 825-26.
207 But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Inside the Bank-
ruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230-31 (forthcoming 2007) (finding that one
group of specialized judges appeared to make decisions in much the same way as generalist
judges).
208 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 685 (1996)
("[A]rbitrators may be consciously or unconsciously influenced by the fact that the com-
pany, rather than the consumer, is a potential source of repeat business."). See generally
Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 189 (1997).
209 See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523
(1997) ("The dynamic of arbitrator self-interest has long been familiar in collective bargain-
ing cases and is thought, for example, to provide one explanation for the apparently common
practice of compromise awards."). But see Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbi-
trators Do Not "Split the Baby" - Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitra-
tions, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 573, 573 (2001) (finding that arbitrators are not making compromise
awards).
210 See, e.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 826-27; Wistrich, Guthrie &
Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1327-28.
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support of arbitration panels differ from those in support of jury trials.2 1 ' In
arbitration, for example, arbitrators often offer the potential advantage of sub-
ject-matter expertise. This is seldom the case in jury trials. On the other hand,
in jury trials, judges can often shield jurors from inadmissible evidence, thereby
decreasing the likelihood that their decision making will be distorted by infor-
mational blinders.2" 2 This is not possible in arbitration. Despite these differ-
ences, though, the potential advantage of both arbitration panels and juries is
that their decisions reflect the wisdom of multiple decision makers.21 3
D. Summary and Caveat
Disputants and their lawyers should take misjudging into account when
selecting a dispute resolution forum. Assuming they do, they may find that
alternative dispute resolution processes, particularly those that are consensual,
hold more appeal than previously anticipated. To be clear, I am not arguing
that disputants and their lawyers should base their forum-selection decisions
solely on the risk of misjudging or that they should inexorably gravitate to
ADR processes. Obviously, choosing a dispute resolution forum or process is
(or at least should be) a complicated decision, involving the consideration of
many factors. Moreover, given the state (limited) and nature (largely experi-
mental) of the research on which I rely in this paper, the forum-selection argu-
ments I advance above are necessarily tentative. Still, the prospect of
misjudging is real - even the best-intentioned judge, like any other human
being, is subject to informational, cognitive, and attitudinal blinders - and dis-
putants and counsel should not turn a blind eye to this possibility when decid-
ing where to resolve disputes.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper is not to criticize judges, though a small number of
them might be "bad," '2 14 and an even smaller number might be corrupt.2 1 5
Rather, the goal of this paper is to suggest that good judges, who make up the
vast majority of the trial bench, are prone to predictable blinders that can lead
them to misjudge.
To say that judges misjudge is to say simply that they are human, and that
their decision making, though often quite good and arguably better than that of
many other expert and novice decision makers,2 16 is subject to error. The prob-
lem with flawed judicial decisions - in contrast to the bad decisions the rest of
211 See generally Drahozal, supra note 195, at 105 (comparing arbitral and jury decision
making).
212 Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1327-28.
213 See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004) (advancing the
argument that groups and markets often produce wise outcomes).
214 Miller, supra note 8, at 432.
215 Id.
216 In our earlier work, Rachlinski, Wistrich, and I wrote as follows:
[D]o these cognitive illusions influence judges as much as they influence other decision makers?
It is difficult to answer this question accurately, because different studies use different materials
and methodologies. Nevertheless ... the judges in our study appear to be just as susceptible as
other decision makers to three of the cognitive illusions we tested: anchoring, hindsight bias, and
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us make - is that they shape the lives of untold numbers of disputants. This
does not necessarily mean that disputants and the lawyers who represent them
should avoid litigation and trial, but it does mean that they should not simply
assume that the courthouse is the best place to resolve their disputes.217
egocentric bias. Though still susceptible to framing and the representativeness heuristic, the
judges appear less susceptible than other decision makers to these effects.
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 816.
217 Or, to state the point in a somewhat different way, they should seek to resolve their
disputes in a "multi-door courthouse" in which they select an appropriate process from an
array of available processes. See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70
F.R.D. 79, 111, 130-31 (1976) (advocating the adoption of multi-door courthouses).
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